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Teece's Competing Through Innovation
Herbert Hovenkamp*

DAVID J. TEECE, COMPETING THROUGH INNOVATION:TECHNOLOGICAL STRATEGIES AND ANTITRUST
POLICIES. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar (2013) (484 + xxxi pp.)
This book collects the scholarly articles written by David Teece and some
co-authors over a period of roughly two decades, although most are since 2000.
The topics relate to innovation and competition policy and the range is broad,
including market definition, the relationship between antitrust policy and
intellectual property rights, and application of antitrust principles to innovation
intensive markets. The articles are reproduced in full, with all notes and figures
intact, and even the original headings and pagination for the reader’s
convenience. The book's fundamental theme, as expressed in the introduction, is
that competition through innovation is fundamentally a different thing than price
and output competition. As a result, traditional price theory and industrial
organization often serves us poorly. The sentiments are more than vaguely
Schumpeterian.
One principle that pervades Teece’s work is that innovation must be
facilitated by means of sufficient private rewards, and in our current system the
rewards are too low. This is true largely because legal regimes such as antitrust
engage in excessive ex post restriction on the deployment of innovation,
particularly on the use of intellectual property rights, and even more particularly,
patents. Teese gives as one example an expansive doctrine of patent “misuse,”
which historically condemned patent practices that had competitively harmless
explanations, such as tying or royalties on total sales. These practices could not
realistically serve to expand the patentee’s market power. The ordinary remedy
in “misuse” cases, which is that the patent becomes unenforceable until the
misuse is terminated, decouples legal doctrine from facilitation of innovation by
limiting the value of patents in situations where no harm is done to the
infringement defendant or, typically, anyone else. Today, of course, successful
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misuse claims are a rarity, as is condemnation of royalties on total sales. The one
relic that remains and needs to be overturned is continued application of the
Brulotte rule disallowing agreements that require royalty or royalty-like payments
after a patent's expiration. Even there, running foul of Brulotte is usually a result
of careless drafting of license agreements, and should not often hinder
innovation.
Another theme that Teece and co-authors develop is that antitrust law’s
traditional tools for measuring market power often go awry when we are talking
about high technology markets. This is so for a number of reasons: high fixed
costs, the relation between high margins and incentives, and thus the reduced
significance of high margins in situations of rapid technological turnover. Also
important are network effects, which often serve to make a single platform more
efficient than multiple competing platforms, but the single platform is then
associated with the evils of monopoly. Additionally, policy makers assessing
market power often fail to distinguish between monopoly returns and what Teece
terms “Schumpeterian rents,” which are the short run returns necessary to
facilitate technological turnover. Quite aside from the phenomenon of high fixed
costs, the highly innovative firm requires a constant stream of revenue above cost
in order to permit continued research and development.
By the same token, Teece believes that the threat of “monopolistic”
conduct in such markets – meaning that the dominant firm locks in its own
technology, excludes rival technologies, and uses its dominance to suppress
output – is relatively unlikely because technology is so difficult to control.
In an interesting piece on innovation in the context of networks and
multiple innovators, co-authored with Deepak Somaya and Simon Wakeman,
Teece explores the implications of individual firm decisions whether to invent for
themselves or purchase their innovations from others. In markets characterized
by multiple competing innovators, each of which may have advantages in its own
domain, the result will be a great deal of cross-licensing. As Teece also suggests,
this is really little more than a corollary of Coase’s article on The Nature of the
Firm. If one firm has internal production and development advantages in
hardware while another firm has it in software, the firm who needs both in order
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to market its product will produce in the market where it has a comparative
advantage, and license from others in markets where it has a comparative
disadvantage. The result will be cross licensing. Multiply this out over markets
that have numerous innovators or inputs and the resulting phenomenon is
widespread cross licensing and its common network companion: standard setting.
The story is more complex, they note, in markets that have clear leaders. If one
firm is far out in front of the others it may be advantageous for it to produce
more internally and license less. If it looks inward too much, however, outside
firms will catch up and even surpass it. The leader may then find itself
technologically isolated. They give as an example Research in Motion, which
developed the Blackberry as a result of its own technological breakthroughs in
mobile email technology. The eventual result of going it alone excessively was
that rival smartphone technologies caught up and surpassed the Blackberry.
On the patent system, Teese’s work generally displays a level of optimism
that puts him in the minority among academics today, although his views may be
more in accord with many judges on the United States Federal Circuit Court of
Appeals. He believes that the value of the patent system in promoting innovation
has generally been underappreciated, while its potential harms and shortcomings
have been exaggerated. The literature on narrow patenting and patent thickets is
one good example. Teece and his co-authors acknowledge the problems posed
by large scale patenting, overly narrow and ambiguous patents, anticommons
problems, and royalty stacking. However, they believe that the literature
discussing these problems has not been sensitive to the offsetting problem of
supporting innovation in markets where inventions come from multiple
innovators and patents serve to commoditize innovations in markets that are
subject to numerous “make or buy” decisions regarding innovation. In such
markets firms produce, purchase, or sell their innovations, permitting each
participant to optimize over their own capabilities, and the patent system serves
the important purpose of creating tradable units of innovation.
That argument may prove too much, however. If firms in a multi-innovator
market really wished to facilitate internal innovation where it is cost-jusitified,
and exchange where it is not, they would have a strong interest in articulating the
exchangeable units in such a way that property rights were clearly defined,
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ownership was unambiguous, and trading was confined to issues of price and
technological suitability. In fact, however, that would be a much different
situation than the one we actually have. Particularly in information technologies,
patents are ambiguously drafted in ways that are calculated to exaggerate the
inventor’s achievements. Patents are so numerous in some markets, and
searching and interpreting them is so costly that the transaction costs of
exchange often induce firms to develop without licensing. Indeed, the rights may
be so poorly defined that the “make or buy” decision is itself highly ambiguous,
with many firms operating under the impression that they are “making,” quite
innocently, when others believe that they should be buying because their
internally developed technology is later found to infringe on the technology of
others.
Or to put it more bluntly, a well functioning system of tradable innovation
rights would require far lower information and related transaction costs than the
system that we actually have. To be sure, the patent itself is certainly a useful
“certificate” describing a unit of innovation. One problem with maintain
innovation as trade secrets is that, while trade secrets may be effective ways of
protecting one’s internal innovations from appropriation by others, trade secrets
themselves are often too inchoate as certificates of innovation to be readily
tradable. Patents can be readily assigned; they can be licensed, both exclusively
and nonexclusively. Aggregation of large numbers of them present few problems
when they are treated as personal property for purposes of exchange. Everything
they stand for is described on a typically small document. Where the patent
system fails us, however, especially in information technologies, is that too often
these certificates are worthless because what they describe is not really a
worthwhile innovation, because interpreting them is very costly, as is determining
whether they are worth purchasing. Recent decisions placing a value on FRANDencumbered patents suggest a ratio between patentee’s claimed value and
judicially determined value exceeding 2000-to-1. This is very far from a well
functioning market.
This may be mainly a collective action problem. As a group, the
manufacturers of cellphones might profit from a much smaller number of clearer
patents, providing little dispute about who owns what and who needs what, and
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thus facilitating exchange. In such a setting make or buy decisions would be
optimal and firms could have some confidence that they were choosing the value
maximizing course. Individually, however, developers of technology have a strong
incentive to overstate and create ambiguity which may serve to enlarge the value
of what they have down the road. Here, the unfortunate reality may be that our
patent system, with its relentless focus on individual appropriation, may be
serving us poorly by undermining rather than facilitating efficient make or buy
decision making.
Teece (along with Thomas M. Jorde and J. Gregory Sidak) also argue that
mandatory unbundling in telecommunications, which requires incumbent
telephone carriers to make their elements available to rivals at administered
prices, would have adverse consequences in both the incumbent and the
competitive markets. On the incumbent side, mandatory unbundling would
diminish the incentive to innovate by reducing the returns to each incumbent’s
element to prices normally associated with public utility regulation. On the
competitive side, the ability to interconnect freely would reduce the incentive of
competitive exchange carriers to develop these elements for themselves. Why
should they, when they are effectively entitled to connect into the incumbent’s
technology at below market level prices? The result is to slow innovation at both
ends.
This collection of articles is provocative, often controversial, and well worth
reading. They provide a great deal to think about, even for the reader who
ultimately may not agree with everything.

